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Abstrat. We disuss a model for evolutionary game dynamis in a growing,
network-strutured population. In our model, new players an either make
onnetions to random preexisting players or preferentially attah to those that
have been suessful in the past. The latter depends on the dynamis of strategies
in the game, whih we implement following the so-alled Fermi rule suh that the
limits of weak and strong strategy seletion an be explored. Our framework allows
to address general evolutionary games. With only two parameters desribing the
preferential attahment and the intensity of seletion, we desribe a wide range
of network strutures and evolutionary senarios. Our results show that even for
moderate payo preferential attahment, over represented hubs arise. Interestingly,
we nd that while the networks are growing, high levels of ooperation are attained,
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but the same network struture does not promote ooperation as a stati network.
Therefore, the mehanism of payo preferential attahment is dierent to those
usually invoked to explain the promotion of ooperation in stati, already-grown
networks.
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1. Introdution
Classial game theory is a branh of applied mathematis that has been developed
to desribe strategi interation between fully rational individuals [1℄. Evolutionary
game theory is an elegant way to abandon the often problemati rationality
assumption of lassial game theory and to introdue a natural dynamis to that
lassial onept [2, 3℄. In the past, evolutionary game theory has been used to
desribe either ultural learning dynamis or geneti reprodution under frequeny
dependent seletion [4℄. More reently, it has attrated a lot of interest in the physis
ommunity in the ontext of nonlinear dynamis [5, 6℄, disordered systems [7, 8, 9℄,
nite size eets [10, 11℄, or spatially extended systems [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18℄.
Statistial mehanis provides a powerful tool to desribe evolutionary game
dynamis in spatially extended, strutured populations. Besides, in the last deade
network theory has ontributed signiantly to our quantitative understanding of
strutured systems whih go beyond the regularity of simple latties [19℄.
A typial setup is the following: Agents are assigned to the nodes of a network,
whih an be a regular lattie or have a more omplex struture. Then, agents
play an evolutionary game in whih more suessful strategies spread on the system.
Desribing these systems analytially is tedious and only possible in speial ases
[20, 21, 22, 23℄. Moreover, there are few general statements that an be made on
evolutionary dynamis in suh spatial systems [24℄.
Here, we drop another simplifying assumption and onsider evolutionary games
in growing, network-strutured populations. In other words, instead of taking a
growth algorithm for a partiular network and later simulate evolutionary dynamis
on that network, we grow the network while the evolutionary game is played.
The interplay between growth and evolutionary game dynamis leads to interesting
network strutures and allows to disentangle eets based on topology from eets
based on growth of the network.
2. Growing strutured populations
We address the ase of a growing population in whih new individuals establish
onnetions to the existing individuals, see also [25℄. The newomers an either
onnet to m arbitrary individuals or preferentially attah to those that have been
suessful players in the past. Suess is based on the umulated payo pi from an
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evolutionary game, whih eah individual plays with all its neighbors on the network.
For the model itself, we do not have to speify the kind of the game or the number
of strategies.
We start from a small omplete network of N0 individuals of one strategy.
Subsequently, new individuals arrive and form onnetions to existing individuals.
Evolutionary dynamis proeeds in the following way:
(i) In eah time step, every individual j plays with all its neighbors and obtains an
aumulated payo pij .
All players hose between their old strategy and the strategy of a randomly
seleted neighbor synhronously. Player j will adopt the strategy of its randomly
seleted neighbor i with probability
Tj→i =
e+β·pii
e+β·pii + e+β·pij
, (1)
where β is the intensity of seletion. With probability 1 − Tj→i, it will stik
to its old strategy. For β ≪ 1, seletion is weak and the game is only a linear
orretion to random strategy hoie. For strong seletion, β → ∞, it will
always adopt a better strategy and it will never adopt a worse strategy. This
proess is routinely used in evolutionary game dynamis [13, 26, 27℄.
(ii) Every τ time steps, a new individual with a random strategy is added to
the system. For τ ≪ 1, several nodes are added before individuals hange
strategies. For τ ≫ 1, the network grows very slowly and the game dynamis
an bring the system lose to equilibrium before a new node is added. The
new individual establishes m links to preexisting nodes, whih are hosen
preferentially aording to their performane in the game in the last time step.
Node j is hosen as an interation partner with probability
pj =
e+α·pij∑N
l=1 e
+α·pil
, (2)
where N is the number of nodes that already exist when the new node is added.
The remaining m − 1 links are added in the same way, exluding double links.
For α = 0, the newomer attahes to a randomly hosen existing node. For small
α, attahment is approximately linear with payo. For high α, the newomers
will make onnetions to only very few nodes with high payos. For α → ∞,
all newomers will always attah to the m most suessful players.
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Sine m links and a single node are added in eah τ time steps, the average
degree of the network is given by
N0(N0 − 1)
1
2
+m t
τ
N0 +
t
τ
, (3)
where t is the number of time steps that has passed. Throughout this work, we will
onentrate on m = 2 and N0 = 3.
Let us rst fous on the simplest ase in whih eah interation leads to the
same payo, whih we set to one. Then, the payos pij are just the number of
interations an individual has, i.e. the degree κj of the node (normalizing by the
degree of the node would essentially wash out the eet of the topology at this point
[28, 29℄). Evolutionary dynamis of strategies has no onsequenes and thus, the
topology is independent of β. This allows us to disuss the growth dynamis without
any ompliations arising from the dynamis of strategies. We have several simple
limiting ases:
• For α = 0, the newomer attahes at random to a new node. This leads to a
network in whih the probability that a node has k links deays exponentially
fast with k. The situation orrespond to the ase studied in [30℄, as individuals
introdued earlier are likely to get more links. In this ase, topology is
independent of strategies for all intensities of seletion β even when individuals
play dierent strategies leading to dierent payos. Whenever α > 0, there is
an interplay between topologial dynamis and strategy dynamis.
• For α≪ 1, we an linearize pj. In this ase, we obtain
pj =
α−1 + κj∑N
k=1 (α
−1 + κk)
. (4)
Thus, we reover the linear preferential attahment model introdued by
Dorogovtsev et al. [31℄. When strategies dier in their payos, then not only
the degree, but also the strategy of the nodes and their neighbors will inuene
the probability to attah to a node.
• When α is large, we will typially observe a network in whih m of the N0 nodes
of the initial omplete network will be onneted to almost all nodes that have
been added during the growth stage. The emergene of these super-hubs hinges
on the nonlinearity in Eq. 2.
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Examples for the network strutures in these limiting ases are given in Fig. 1.
Next, we turn to evolutionary games in whih the payo per interation is no
longer onstant, but depends on the strategies of the two interating individuals.
In general, suh an interplay of evolutionary dynamis of the strategies and the
payo-preferential attahment will hange the struture of the network.
3. Playing evolutionary games during growth
In priniple, our framework allows to address any game between individuals, even
repeated games or games with many strategies an be onsidered. However, we
fous on the Prisoner's Dilemma here as an example of a one-shot game with two
strategies [32, 33, 34℄. Two players an hoose between ooperation and defetion.
In the simplest ase, there is a ost c to ooperation, whereas a ooperative at from
an interation partner leads to a benet b (> c). The game an be written in the
form of a payo matrix,
( C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
)
. (5)
No matter what the opponent does, defetion leads to a higher payo (due to
b > b − c and 0 > −c). Thus selsh, rational players should defet. Similarly,
if the payo determines reprodutive tness, evolution will lead to the spread of
defetion. However, the payo for mutual defetion is smaller than the payo for
mutual ooperation (b− c > 0) and thus players fae a dilemma. One way to resolve
the dilemma is to onsider strutured populations in whih players only interat with
their neighbors [35℄. Here, we follow this line of researh and onsider in addition
growing populations, as disussed above.
Typially, one is interested in the promotion of ooperation on dierent network
strutures. Fig. 2 shows the average level of ooperation for strong seletion as a
funtion of τ . It turns out that payo preferential attahment inreases the level of
ooperation signiantly ompared to random attahment. This eet is also present
for weak seletion, but less pronouned. Cooperation inreases most for small τ , i.e.
when many nodes are added before strategies are hanged. This puts the system
further from equilibrium, whereas the ase of large τ means that strategies have been
equilibrated at least loally before the next new individual with a random strategy is
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Figure 1: Networks for a game in whih both strategies have idential payos, suh that the payo
is given by the degree of a node. The left hand side shows the degree distributions of networks
of size N = 104, while the right hand side are snapshots of networks of N = 100 nodes. (a) For
α = 0.0, the degree distribution deays exponentially. (b) For α = 0.1, some highly onneted nodes
appear in the network and the degree distribution begins to resemble a power-law. () Already for
α = 1.0, the vast majority of nodes (>99.9 %) has only two links. In addition, m = 2 of the N0 = 3
initial nodes are onneted to almost all other nodes (degree distributions are obtained from an
average over 100 networks, note that the x-axis is linear in (a), but logarithmi in (b) and ()).
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Figure 2: The average level of ooperation under strong seletion (β = 1) and α = 1 depending on
the time sale of attahment, τ . Cooperation benets most from small values of τ , i.e. when many
new nodes are added before players update their strategies. For random attahment (α = 0, inset)
ooperation does not emerge, only for high benet to ost ratios a few ooperators prevail (m = 2,
N0 = 3, values obtained from 10
2
averages over networks of nal size N = 1000, averaged when the
network stops growing).
added to the system. Note that for τ larger than a ertain value, ooperation levels
beome independent of τ , whih points out that playing one a given number of new
players are inorporated is enough to reah a dynamial equilibrium.
Sine there is an interation between strategy dynamis and network growth,
the topology will hange under seletion. In Fig. 3, we show how the topology for
the Prisoner's Dilemma hanges with the benet to ost ratio b/c, the intensity of
seletion β and the attahment parameter α (see also Fig.1). It turns out that the
inuene of the game on the degree distribution is relatively weak, for small degrees
a lear dierene is only found for large α and small b/c. The distribution of the
relatively few nodes with many onnetions, however, is more sensitive to hanging
either b/c or β.
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Figure 3: Impat of the game dynamis on the degree distribution at the end of network growth.
Left olumn orresponds to α = 0.1, while the right one is for α = 1. In general, game dynamis has
only a weak impat on the topology of the system. However, there is a trend that stronger seletion
inreases the number of nodes with fewer links and dereases the number of highly onneted nodes
(N0 = 3, m = 2, τ = 0.1, distributions averaged 10
3
over realizations of networks of 10
3
nodes
eah).
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4. Promotion of ooperation in growing networks
As in most strutured populations, ooperators that are disadvantageous in the
Prisoner's Dilemma in well-mixed population benet from the spatial struture. Of
ourse, this eet is larger when ooperation beomes more protable, i.e. when the
benet to ost ratio b/c inreases. It turns out that for weak payo preferential
attahment (small α), the promotion of ooperation is relatively weak and levels
of ooperation beyond 50 % are only reahed when ooperation is very protable,
see Fig. 4. However, when the probability to attah to the most suessful nodes
beomes large (large α), then the average fration of ooperators beomes larger,
approahing one when the benet ost ratio b/c is large.
Interestingly, for small b/c ratios, the abundane of ooperators dereases with
inreasing β, whereas it inreases with the intensity of seletion for large b/c ratios.
The existene of a threshold for intermediate b/c an be illustrated as follows for
large α: Assume that we start from N0 fully onneted ooperator nodes. For
τ < 1, we add 1/τ nodes with m = 2 links, on average half of them defetors and
half of them ooperators. All new players interat only with the initial ooperator
nodes, suh that an initial ooperator will on average obtain
m
N0τ
new links. Thus,
the payo of a new defetor is mb. The average payo of an initial ooperator is
(b− c)(N0 − 1 +
1
2
m
N0τ
)− c1
2
m
N0τ
. Both payos are idential for
b
c
=
1
τ
+ N0(N0−1)
m
1
2τ
−N0 +
N0(N0−1)
m
. (6)
For large b/c, ooperators will dominate in the very beginning of network growth.
The threshold inreases with τ and dereases with N0: The larger the initial
ooperator luster and the more nodes are added before strategies are updated, the
easier it is for ooperation to spread initially. This argument shows qualitatively that
a rossover in the abundane of ooperators should exist, and therefore that above a
ertain threshold, it is easier for ooperation to spread. Only in the very beginning
of network growth, this argument will hold quantitatively.
In general, the average level of ooperation an be based on two very dierent
senarios: Either it is the fration of realizations of the proess that ultimately
ends in full ooperation, or it is the average abundane of ooperators in a network
in whih both ooperators and defetors are present. For any nite intensity of
seletion β, we have Tj→i > 0, regardless of the payos. Thus, after growth has
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Figure 4: The average level of ooperation 〈c〉 104 time steps after the network stops growing. For
α = 0.1 (left) the level of ooperation exeeds 50 % only for very high benet to ost ratios b/c.
For α = 1.0 (right), the abundane of ooperators is signiantly higher. Even for neutral strategy
dynamis (β = 0), payo preferential attahment an lead to high levels of ooperation in this ase
(N0 = 3, m = 2, τ = 0.1, averages over 10
3
dierent networks of size 10
3
).
stopped, our dynamis desribes a reurrent Markov hain with two absorbing states
in whih all players follow one of the two strategies. Therefore, ultimately one of
the two strategies will go extint, in ontrast to evolutionary proesses that do not
allow disadvantageous strategies to spread [25℄. However, the time to extintion
an beome very large, in partiular when the intensity of seletion is high or the
population size is large [27, 36℄. In Fig. 5, we analyze this issue numerially. We
address the probability that xation (for either ooperation or defetion) ours
within 104 time steps after the network has stopped growing. For small α, the
results follow the intuition from well-mixed populations: Fixation within this time
is more likely if the intensity of seletion is weaker. With inreasing benet to ost
ratio, xation times inrease and a xation within the rst 104 time steps beomes
less and less likely.
For large α, however, xation is faster for strong seletion (large β) for a wide
range of parameters. Only when the b/c ratio is very high, xation times are very
large under strong seletion. This is based on the peuliar struture of the network
obtained for large α. In addition, we observe an area in Fig. 5 where the xation
time inreases slightly before it dereases again, i.e. the probability for xation in
the rst 104 time steps has a minimum. Interestingly, this ours for the range of
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Figure 5: The probability of xation for one strategy within 10
4
time steps after growth has
stopped in dependene of the attahment parameter α (left olumn α = 0.1, right olumn α = 1)
for dierent intensities of seletion β. For small α, the degree distribution deays exponentially and
xation is relatively fast, regardless of the intensity of seletion. For α = 1.0, the network is more
heterogeneous. As disussed in the text, for intermediate values of b/c (≈ 3.5), the probability of
xation within 10
4
time steps is smaller than for higher and smaller b/c. For very high b/c and
strong seletion, one observes a oexistene of ooperators and defetors for a very long time rather
than xation for one of the strategies (N0 = 3, m = 2, τ = 0.1, averages over 10
3
independent
realizations of a network of 10
3
nodes).
b/c ratios where the average levels of ooperation interset at 50 % for the dierent
intensities of seletion. In this parameter region, neither ooperators nor defetors are
learly favored. Thus, they will initially both spread. When the abundane of both
strategies is approximately onstant in the beginning, then it will be more diult
to ompletely wipe out one strategy later. Thus, the inreased time of xation in the
parameter region where the abundane of ooperation beomes 50% makes intuitive
sense.
5. Does ooperation benet from growth or only from topology?
Typially, the promotion of ooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma is analyzed on
stati networks. Our model allows a feedbak between the game dynamis and the
growth of the network.
What happens when the network stops growing? Typially, one would expet
that defetors prot from growth, beause there is a steady ow of new ooperators
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Figure 6: Does ooperation benet from the topology only or also from growth? Here we analyze
the average level of ooperation in three ases, (i) one the network is fully grown (ii) after the
game dynamis has proeeded 10
4
additional steps beyond the growth phase of the network (iii)
10
4
time steps after the fully grown network has been re-initialized with random strategies. Clearly,
the grown networks itself do not promote ooperation signiantly. Instead, the growth phase is of
ruial importane. The intensity of seletion has only a minor inuene on the phenomenon. (a)
β = 0.01, (b) β = 0.1, and () β = 0.5 (N0 = 3, m = 2, τ = 0.1, averages over at least 10
2
networks
of size 10
3
, α = 0.1 in all ases).
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that they an potentially exploit. Thus, ooperation should inrease if the game
dynamis proeeds on the fully grown, stati network. This has also been observed
in a previous paper [25℄. In ontrast to that paper, here we have hanged the game
dynamis in suh a way that individuals sometimes an also adopt a worse strategy.
It has been shown that this seemingly small hange an signiantly derease the
level of ooperation [37℄. The overall level of ooperation drops signiantly and
is only higher than 50% if ooperation is very protable. In addition, the level of
ooperation now deays one the network no longer grows, see Fig. 6. This means
that ooperators, not defetors, benet from the ontinuous supply of new players.
Next, we an ask whether the topologies that are obtained from the network
growth are powerful promoters of ooperation at all. This an be tested by taking
the fully grown, stati network and run the game dynamis on the xed network
with initially random strategies, 50% ooperators and 50 % defetors. Interestingly,
this does not lead to any signiant levels of ooperation, f. Fig. 6. Thus, our
model of network growth based on payo preferential attahment itself leads to
omparably high levels of ooperation, while the resulting topology alone does not
support ooperation in the Prisoner's dilemma.
6. Disussion
Our model for evolutionary game dynamis in a growing, network-strutured
population is a dynamial network model [38℄. Here, the network grows, in ontrast to
most models for evolutionary games on dynamial networks that onsider a onstant
population size [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51℄. Individuals annot
break links and annot ontrol diretly how many new individuals will establish
onnetions with them.
An important dierene with previous work [25℄ is that under strong payo
preferential attahment, the topology of the networks generated are dominated by
the presene of a few hubs, whih attrat most of the links of the rest of the nodes.
The existene of very few hubs and a large number of lowly onneted nodes in
network models have been previously notied [52℄. In fat, it has been shown that
when networks are grown following a non-linear preferential attahment rule of the
sort pj =
kνj
PN
l=1 k
ν
l
, with ν > 1, star like strutures are obtained [53℄. Here, we have
shown that the same kind of networks are produed when the dynamis driving the
attahment proess is dominated by the most suessful players. Even when payo
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preferential attahment is not too strong (for instane, for α = 0.1), super-hubs
emerge, a lear mark that suessful players are likely to attrat many of the links
of the new nodes.
If newomers preferentially attah to the suessful players in the game, then
high levels of ooperation are possible. But this ooperation hinges upon the growth
of the network, the population struture alone would not lead to suh high levels of
ooperation. Thus, payo preferential attahment diers from the usual promotion
of ooperation in strutured populations. In partiular, it has been suspeted that
heterogeneous strutures favor ooperative behavior due to the existene of hubs.
However, as Fig. 6 shows, the presene of super-hubs is not enough to sustain
ooperation in the networks grown following the sheme disussed here.
In other models, the probability to adopt a strategy that performs worse is zero
[16, 25, 23℄. In partiular together with synhronous updating of strategies, this an
lead to evolutionary deadloks, i.e. situations in whih both strategies stably oexist.
Here, we have adopted an update sheme in whih individuals sometimes adopt a
strategy that performs worse. Due to the presene of suh irregular moves, sooner
or later (often muh later) one strategy will reah xation. However, when β and
the ratio b/c are large enough, both ooperation and defetion an oexist for a long
time.
Let us also remark that our growth mehanism has also another interesting
feature: It has been shown that the average level of ooperation obtained in stati,
sale-free networks, is robust to a wide range of initial onditions [54℄. However,
for the networks grown using the payo preferential attahment, the initial average
number of ooperators in the neighborhood of the super-hubs determines the fate of
ooperation in the whole network, leading to a muh more sensible dependene on
the initial state of the system. From this point of view, the weak dependene on the
initial onditions reported in stati sale-free networks is not trivial.
Finally, we point out that it would be of further interest to study the model
disussed here with other 2×2 games. As we have shown, the game dynamis seems
to have a weak impat on the struture of the resulting networks. Whether or not
this holds in general will eluidate the question of the inuene of dierent games
on the network formation proess. For instane, within the model disussed in [45℄,
dierent topologies emerge when dierent game dynamis are implemented.
In summary, our model shows that the interplay of game dynamis and network
growth leads to omplex network strutures. Moreover, not only the struture of
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the interation network is important for the evolution of ooperation, but also the
partiular way this struture is obtained. Our work shows that playing while growing
an lead to radially dierent results with respet to the most studied ases in whih
game dynamis proeeds in stati networks.
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